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PUBLIC RIGHTS, PRIVATE RITES
Reliving Richmond Newspapers For My Father*
Laurence H. Tribe**
I.
When I've been asked about my first Supreme Court
argument, my resum6 reflex has easily generated a routine reply:
The case was Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia.' A man was on
trial for the fourth time for stabbing a hotel manager to death.
The first trial had resulted in a conviction, thrown out on appeal
because the state had introduced inadmissible evidence. The
second and third trials had both ended in mistrials. From the
perspective of the accused, the fourth time was a charm. He
waived his right to a jury and his right to have the trial
conducted in public view; the prosecutor made no objection and
the trial judge, giving no special justification, simply expelled
all observers from the courtroom-including the press and even
the victim's children, who were summarily denied any right to
watch what passed for justice being done. After a brief hearing
behind closed doors, the defendant was acquitted and set free. A
transcript was made available a couple of days later to those
who were baffled by the sudden reversal of fortune, but we all
know what cold comfort and limited information a printed page
of dialogue conveys.
Less than a year earlier, in a case where the press and the
public had similarly been excluded-there, from a pretrial
hearing on a motion to suppress evidence, Gannett Co. v.
* © Laurence H. Tribe. This essay first appeared at 6 Green Bag 2d 289 (2003).
** Tyler Professor of Constitutional Law, Harvard Law School.
1. 448 U.S. 555 (1980).
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DePasquale2-the Supreme Court had ruled that the Sixth
Amendment right to a "public trial" belonged solely to the
accused and was thus the accused's to assert or to waive.
Because the accused in Richmond Newspapers had waived his
right to a public trial, persuading the Court to hear the case-
especially so soon after Gannett-was a real challenge. In fact,
when counsel for Richmond Newspapers first contacted me
about the case, he told me that the client had "[a]t present...
decided not to petition the United States Supreme Court for
certiorari," a decision I convinced the client to reverse. But
because this essay is about my first argument and not about the
distinct business of persuading the Court to grant review, I'll
skip to the merits and turn to the no less challenging puzzle of
how one might overcome the accused's waiver of his Sixth
Amendment right to have the proceedings conducted in public.
It was settled that the accused had no "mirror-image" right
to insist that the proceedings be private, and it seemed to me
relevant, possibly crucial, that this was therefore a case where a
state official-the trial judge-was entrusted with discretionary
power to decide what the public would be permitted to observe
and what it would be prevented from observing. That wouldn't
be so unusual if we were dealing with purely internal
government matters like Oval Office consultations. But this
discretionary government power was being exercised with
respect to a proceeding that someone outside the government-
namely, the accused-could have made public had he wished to
do so. That took the case outside the realm of government
control over information generated internally for government's
own use and made it look more like government determination
of what sights and sounds in the public domain were fit to be
seen and heard. Wasn't that the essence of censorship?
Well, in a way. But there was one problem, at least as I saw
the case: To make an argument based on the First Amendment
freedoms of speech and press, one classically needed to have a
willing speaker: the right to observe and hear is just the flip side
of a right to broadcast or speak, and in this case nobody in the
courtroom wanted to speak to mere spectators-not to the
Richmond Newspapers, and certainly not to the victim's family.
2. 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
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So the First Amendment didn't completely suffice-unless one
treated it as a very broad structural guarantee of access to
information in an open society, a guarantee not enumerated
anywhere in the Bill of Rights, but one reinforced by the Ninth
Amendment's mandate that the Constitution's "enumeration...
of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage
others retained by the people." 3
But the Ninth Amendment, I learned as I briefed Richmond
Newspapers and as I found myself being lobbied hard by the
pillars of the media bar, was barely to be mentioned in polite
society, much less was it ready for prime time.
Who was I, an utter novice at Supreme Court advocacy, to
buck the conventional wisdom on something so basic? Well, I
was a lawyer who'd taken a case because he believed in it,
who'd been teaching and would teach generations more of law
students about the kinds of questions the case raised, who'd
gone on record a couple of years earlier in a treatise, American
Constitutional Law,4 on most of the issues the case touched, and
who cared a lot more about keeping faith with what he'd feel
bound to write and teach in years to come, and with how he
thought the Court should be approached, than with what the
Poo-Bahs of the establishment thought of him. That's who I
was. And am. So the Ninth Amendment argument stayed in.
And, I'm happy to report, in the end it hit its target.
As Justice Stevens was to write in his concurring opinion,
"never before ha[d] [the Court] squarely held that the
acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional
protection whatsoever."' Where was that protection to be found
in the Constitution's text? Nowhere, exactly, but the plurality
opinion of Chief Justice Burger made a point of recalling how
James Madison-responding to widely voiced concerns at the
time of the Founding that adding any finite list of rights to the
Constitution to assuage the fears of some about potentially
excessive government power might perversely backfire, carrying
a negative implication about rights not mentioned-had
3. U.S. Const. amend. IX.
4. Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (1st ed., Found. Press 1978)
(available in its current incarnation as Laurence H. Tribe, American Constitutional Law
vol. 1 (3d ed., Found. Press 2000)).
5. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 582 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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spearheaded a move that "culminat[ed] in the Ninth
Amendment," which was to operate as a "constitutional 'saving
clause,' . . . to foreclose application to the Bill of Rights of the
maxim that the affirmation of particular rights implies a
negation of those not expressly defined."6 The right recognized
in Richmond Newspapers, although it was later described simply
as a First Amendment right (and might thereby be said to have
emerged with free speech wings that had shed the Ninth
Amendment chrysalis from which it sprang), became the first of
only two rights ever grounded by a Supreme Court majority or
plurality in an analysis that spelled out its debt to the Ninth
Amendment as a rule about how to construe the Constitution.
The other such right was that of reproductive choice, whose
reaffirmance in a 1992 plurality opinion, Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,7 was also expressly linked
to the Ninth Amendment as a rule of construction.
II.
Richmond Newspapers became a landmark, albeit not one
whose final shape can yet be drawn with any real authority. In
the wake of the unspeakable events of 9/11, the war on
international terrorism not just abroad but at home has
predictably called forth arguments for heightened government
secrecy, including the closure of deportation and other hearings
previously open to the public. Courts grappling with the need to
strike a balance consistent both with public safety and with our
constitutional traditions have derived conflicting conclusions as
to the reach of Richmond Newspapers' principle of public
access, with some deferring to the executive branch8 and others
stressinf history's lesson that "[d]emocracies die behind closed
doors." Large public questions are at stake. So it's easy for me
to "do" Richmond Newspapers as a still unfinished chapter in
the development of constitutional law, and it's a cinch for me to
"do" the case as an entry in my c.v., a few lines in a
professional biography.
6. Id. at 579 n. 15.
7. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
8. N. J. Media Group, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2002).
9. Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002).
FIRST ARGUMENT-TRIBE
This time, though, I felt the tug of something very different.
Asked to write in a personal vein about my first argument at the
Court, I felt an impulse I had always previously suppressed
whenever the cursor pointed to the "Richmond Newspapers"
icon on my mental desktop. It was an impulse born, I think, of a
simple desire to release a painful truth,. a jagged connection, a
link whose roots are personal, not professional or academic or
legal. It was an impulse that I had previously held in check by a
sense that it would be indecorous, self-indulgent, egotistical, for
me to inject into the account of Richmond Newspapers as a
public fact anything quite so private as what the case happened
to mean by virtue of its seemingly accidental intersection with
my life's trajectory.
Yet, as I reflected on it, I began to wonder whether the
private story-the story that repeats itself silently whenever the
public script turns to Richmond Newspapers-might in some
way haveiaffected what I had dared to say on that February day,
or how I argued this point or that. Maybe it did, in some remote
way, even affect what the Court wrote in the case. None of us is
in full command of precisely which private facts might have left
their trace on the public world. But my main reason for deciding
to tell the story here was just that it's too large a part of who I
am for me to leave it permanently submerged.
Whether that story matters to anybody but me is, in the end,
beside the point. Maybe most of the deepest stories, the stories
that frame and etch our lives, are like that: whether and why
they "matter" and to whom is outside the frame-like what
"really" happened, in a novel you've just finished reading, to a
character whose fate the author left unresolved, as in the
haunting image with which Dylan Thomas closed but never
ended one of his loveliest poems-the image in which:
The ball I threw while playing in the park
Has not yet reached the ground.
III.
So here's my story. It begins with a brief, too brief, phone
conversation I had with my father late in the evening on
10. The poem is Should Lanterns Shine.
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February 3, 1980. Not long before, I'd received Virginia's brief
on the merits in Richmond Newspapers. I'd begun writing my
reply brief, due ten days later, and preparing for the oral
argument, set for February 19. The next day-February 4-
would be my parents' fortieth wedding anniversary. I'd planned
to wait until that day to phone them, but Carolyn had urged me
not to wait, to phone home that night instead. (Carolyn and I had
been married just sixteen years then. "Just sixteen?" When I
was growing up, anyone who had been married for even fifteen
years had to be ancient. Next year, it will be our fortieth
anniversary. Can that possibly be true?) I wanted to wait until it
was my parents' actual anniversary day, but I went along with
Carolyn, not wanting to argue. So I phoned and wished my
mother and father a happy "not-quite-anniversary" that night,
and then I said good-bye. That would be the last time I would
ever hear my father's voice.
If Carolyn hadn't convinced me to call San Francisco that
night, I wouldn't be able to recall to this day just when it was
that I would have spoken with my father last. We didn't talk all
that often, my father and I. We loved each other a lot, but not
that many words were involved. The next day, forty years to the
day after my parents were married in Shanghai, my father
suddenly collapsed at home while my mother was at work. He
was 78, not really old even by 1980 standards, but not young
either. He'd had his share of ailments, but his mind was clear
and nothing like this had seemed to be in the wings. Yet he had
suffered a massive cardiopulmonary failure from which he never
recovered.
That afternoon I found myself oddly tired, having no idea
yet what had just happened to my father a continent away. I lay
in bed and, as Carolyn and I both remember my telling her at the
time, I had felt a peculiar numbness, an eerie detachment that I
couldn't recall ever having felt before. We both remember my
telling her that the only way I could describe it was to say I felt
that I was, well, dying. Within minutes, the call came from San
Francisco telling Carolyn, who then told me, that my father had
collapsed and been taken to the hospital. He was in critical
condition. There was no way to predict whether he would
survive the night. My first reaction was disbelief. Then grief,
fear, guilt, hope that he would take a sudden turn for the better,
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then certainty that he wouldn't. I took the first flight home I
could. Out the airplane window, I thought I saw a shooting star.
It took longer than usual to disappear from view. Somehow I
knew it was my father. I cried all the way across the country.
My father had died before the plane landed in San Francisco.
The next several days remain a blur. Twenty-three years
later, though, the pain itself still remains sharp. It helped, in an
odd way, that the Richmond Newspapers reply brief remained to
be completed and filed and that the oral argument in the case,
the first I was to present at the Court (although the lawyers who
had retained me to do the case hadn't realized, I later learned,
that I would be cutting my teeth on quite so large a bone), was
set for just two weeks later. It gave me something external to
worry about. For just that reason, I suppose it helped, oddly, that
the Supreme Court Clerk's Office, while always extremely
helpful-one quickly learns that the clerk of just about any court
is unbending in inverse proportion to the court's power and its
rank in the judicial hierarchy-informed me the Court would be
unable to change the date this close to a scheduled argument,
despite something as wrenching as a parent's sudden death.
(Having dealt with the Supreme Court Clerk's Office a good bit
since then, I have the feeling that, if I had been around the track
a few more times, I might have found a way around the
situation; the Clerk and Deputy Clerks are a tremendously
thoughtful and resourceful group once you get to know them.
But that was my first time up, and I didn't really have a clue
about how to ask for what. ) So the briefing and argument
schedule were fixed in stone, and in those days-that was long
before I'd developed the tiny coterie of brilliant former students
and friends (who, at one time or another, included Kathleen
Sullivan and Peter Rubin, and who still include Tom Goldstein,
Jonathan Massey, and Brian Koukoutchos) who would work on
cases with me and could have stood in for me in a pinch-there
was nobody to whom I could hand the baton.
In none of the thirty or so Supreme Court cases that I've
argued since Richmond Newspapers have I passed the days
leading up to oral argument in anything like the unfocused,
disoriented frame of mind in which I felt those days and nights
slip by. In retrospect, I imagine I must have concentrated
somehow on the details of the case, the themes I wanted to
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stress, the major problems I saw in the position I thought the
Court should take. I know that urgent phone calls imploring me,
above all else, to forget that "crazy Ninth Amendment
argument," didn't even scratch the surface of what I was
feeling. Literally all I recall about writing the reply brief-which
ended (I've just reread it) with a call upon the Court to vindicate
"a tradition.., demonstrably central to the public awareness
and institutional accountability that define our form of
government" -is that I refused to use that brief as a vehicle for
backing away from the Ninth Amendment, whose affirmation of
rights unwritten and unseen I think I was almost beginning to
identify, in some then still unconscious way, with the mystery of
why I'd fortunately agreed to call my father the night before his
anniversary; of why I'd felt the knock of doom before our phone
had rung; and, above all, of what I'd seen streaking across the
predawn sky out of the airplane window.
Reflecting now on my resolute commitment to arguing the
case in Ninth Amendment terms-and thus in terms of the
Constitution's "tacit postulates," which my opening brief had
reminded then-Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger that
they had only recently described as no less "engrained in the
fabric of the document [than] its express provisions" "-I think
my grief may have permitted me to see a bit more clearly
through the fog of superficial arguments and objections and may
have steeled me against the kinds of eleventh-hour distractions
and importunings that co-counsel, meaning to be helpful, are
prone to inject as a Supreme Court argument nears.
But as I think back to those days and nights now, most of
what I remember is the non-stop sense of loss. I remember my
surprise at the huge hole in my world where my father, not a
physically large man, had been. I remember staring, as I
prepared for the argument, at the watch my father had been
given by the car dealership for which he worked, not for selling
the most cars-he was much too honest ever to win a prize like
that-but for being a really terrific guy, kind and generous to all
the other salesmen (and they were all salesmen in those days)
and the janitors and the customers, including the ones he'd
11. Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 433 (1979) (Rehnquist, J., and Burger, C.J.,
dissenting).
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persuaded they didn't really need to buy a car. That watch,
which I still have, of course made me enormously proud of who
my father was. I remember my hopeless, amateurish efforts to
console my mother, then only 65, a woman of large, unrealized
potential and abandoned dreams, born in Harbin, Manchuria, in
1915, who lived through two world wars the second of which
left her alone caring for me while my father, by then an
American citizen, was interned near Shanghai in a Japanese
concentration camp. I remember how hard I'd found it to accept
as a fact that I would never again see that sweet, gentle man,
born in Byelorussia in 1902, whom I'd never gotten around to
asking, and now could never ask, about how he'd managed to
migrate through eight time zones to Siberia and through
Manchuria to Shanghai while he was still in his teens; whom I'd
never really asked, and now would never be able to ask, about
his travels to California while he was still in his twenties, when
he had become a United States citizen-a man who was, by all
accounts, filled with mischief and adventure before his years of
internment by the Japanese, the years that must have changed
him so deeply before he became my father, the man whose eyes
would well up with tears each time he and my mom saw me off
at the airport, the proud and quiet man who would never hear me
argue a case or read of my successes at the Court.
Even as I stood up to argue, a large part of me was not in
that chamber, its pale marble columns gleaming against a sober
background of mahogany and deep red velvet. Part of me was
reliving my father's funeral, the open casket, the shock of
discovering that the man I loved as "pop" was not actually
inside that box, something I might never have fully accepted had
I not been able to look for myself. I remember thinking just for a
few seconds about the family of the murdered hotel manager in
Virginia. I remember understanding, in a fuller way than I could
have imagined when I first took the case, that the murdered
man's wife and kids were among the victims of the state's
decision to conduct that trial outside their gaze. For them, seeing
the processes of justice conclude that the man on trial was
innocent of their father's slaying might in some way have been
like what I needed to see before the casket closed. I was thinking
about that victim's family just as I stood up in the Supreme
Court chamber that day, and I was gratified to see the eventual
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plurality opinion rely, if only in passing, on the family's right to
observe. I think my commitment to victims' rights, even to the
point of working with an unlikely coalition of Senators across
the political spectrum on a possible victims' rights amendment
to the Constitution, has its roots in the emotional equation I felt
as I stood before the Court to argue Richmond Newspapers so
soon after seeing my father's body in that casket.
IV.
As I stood and heard myself for the first time intone the
comfortingly unchanging formula, "Mr. Chief Justice, and may
it please the Court," I was struck by how nearby the Justices
were. They were close enough for ordinary conversation; it was
only the power of their robes that put them at such a distance.
The nine of them that day appeared neither imposing nor
frightening but actually rather benevolent. Whatever nervous
edge I've felt on every subsequent time up there-an edge I try
to use to my advantage, an edge that dissipates only after the
give-and-take of argument is underway-was something I don't
recall feeling at all, even when I first stood up, on February 19,
1980. I had been through something large enough to put oral
argument into perspective-and, put in perspective, what I was
about to do seemed rather small. I hadn't done any sort of moot
court to prepare for argument-the circumstances of my father's
death and funeral put that out of the question-and that practice,
of not preceding an argument with a moot of any kind, quickly
turned into an invariable habit with me: I've never done one and
never plan to.
To make matters easier (if less edgy and in a way less
enjoyable) on my first time up, in those days the questioning by
the Justices was more gingerly than it has since become. Often
as many as three or four of the Justices would listen to an entire
hour of oral argument without asking a single question. That
February day was no different. I do recall how.odd it felt to be
asked a series of questions by Potter Stewart, the Justice for
whom I had clerked a dozen or so years earlier. Those years had
passed with amazing speed-though not quite as quickly, as I
reflect on it, as the nearly quarter century that has flown by
between then and now (although in other ways that gap feels
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like an eternity). Not long before, it seemed to me as I stood up
there, I'd been a law clerk in the Stewart chambers, working
with him on opinions that years later I'd teach about, opinions
like Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Company2 and Katz v. United
States.'3 But on that cold February day in 1980, I was just
another lawyer advocating a cause, a lawyer who had lost a
father and who had tried to help his own son (Mark, then 13)
and daughter (Kerry, then 7) understand what that meant while
comforting them with the thought that their turn to experience
such loss still lay far ahead.
I think I had felt emboldened by the circumstances not to
pull my punches. If I felt convinced, as I did, that the victims of
the Virginia murder belonged in that courtroom-both in the
literal reality of the courtroom back in Virginia, and in the
virtual reality of the Courtroom in Washington D.C.-the fact
that their doctrinal relevance was less than perfectly plain wasn't
going to deter me from bringing them to life. And when then-
Justice Rehnquist had oddly asked me, early in the argument,
just where Hanover County, in which the trial took place, was
located, I remember thinking about how my plans actually to
visit the courthouse had been upended by the funeral. I
remember realizing that I obviously mustn't mention that simple
human fact in my reply to the Justice. I couldn't appear to be
asking for his sympathy, I remember thinking.. So I said: "It's
some miles from Richmond, Mr. Justice." Justice Rehnquist,
who was ultimately the sole dissenter in the case, was
conspicuously studying a large map. He looked up at me over
the edge of the unfolded paper he was holding up at the bench
and said, matter-of-factly, "Well .... that's like, most places are
some miles from Richmond...."
What comes back to me most clearly about that moment
was that I felt not the slightest embarrassment at my obvious
inability to satisfy the Justice's curiosity. All I said was, "I'm
afraid I haven't been in Hanover County, Justice Rehnquist." At
another time, in another context, I might well have felt driven to
try to say something clever. Not that time. So, I didn't know
where Hanover County was. Big whoop. I did know-and my
12. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
13. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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brief had explained and my argument had underscored-that the
Hanover County Courthouse, a diagram of which I'd hired an
architect to draw so we could include it as an appendix to our
brief and a photo of which I'd appended for good measure, was
the place where, I'd been delighted to discover in the library
(which was where we used to do research back in the day, prior
to the advent of the web), Patrick Henry had delivered one of his
soaring orations extolling liberty and savaging the tyranny of
King George Ill-and that he'd delivered it to a packed
courtroom, with people literally hanging from the rafters, a sight
I thought the Court could more easily conjure with the aid of
that architect's diagram. So much for the argument that, as the
trial judge had vaguely hinted, something peculiar about the
architecture of the building might have made it unsuitable for
the presence of public observers.
Virginia's Attorney General was up next. I listened to his
half hour, taking a note or two, and then stood up, with two
minutes of my half hour remaining, for what the transcript
suggests was a fairly spirited rebuttal. The red light on the
Court's podium must have' gone on when the transcript shows
me saying, awkwardly, "My time is up." (Pretty klutzy way to
close, but then I don't think I've ever found a really elegant way
to wind up without overstaying my welcome in a Court that, if
nothing else, certainly runs on schedule.) But Chief Justice
Burger kept me at the podium. He wanted to probe the sources
of other rights (he had quite a litany to ask about) that, as I'd
urged was true of the right to observe trials, might be rooted
more in constitutional tradition and structure than in explicit
constitutional text. I imagine-this is pure supposition, not
actual memory-that I must have worked at suppressing a huge
grin, realizing, as I must have realized by then, that the Chief,
not someone I'd tentatively counted in my corner when the day
began, was seemingly asking for help in sketching what was to
become the analysis in his plurality opinion overturning the
decision of the Virginia Supreme Court and holding that
criminal trials must, absent extraordinary need, be open to the
press and public.
Needless to say, I was only too happy to oblige. Our back-
and-forth must have gone on for a couple of minutes, with the
red light on all the while (one lesson you learn arguing at the
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Court is to take those lights very seriously, but not quite as
seriously as you take the Chief Justice), until the Chief finally
asked-referring to my submission that only a closure order
narrowly tailored to a compelling need could overcome the right
I was asking the Court to declare-whether we "could prevail
by applying a different standard than compelling need." "We
could prevail by applying any standard other than no need at
all," I replied. When the Chief said, "That's right," his words
must have been music to my ears. And when I said, "Thank
you," I'm sure I meant it. I sat down. A few months after that,
on July 2, the last day of the 1979-80 Term, the Court handed
down its ruling in Richmond Newspapers. We had won. We had
won, but my father was still gone.
I looked back just a few days ago, when I began writing
this memoir, at the desk calendar that I kept in 1980. February 5
is clearly and starkly marked as the day my father died, at 9:28
a.m. on the west coast. February 19 contains a scribbled "LT to
argue in USSCt.," without so much as a mention of the name of
the case. For July 2, the day I expected I'd surely find some sort
of notation marking the Court's ruling in my client's favor in
Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, I found I'd written nothing
about the case at all. Nothing at all.

